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AN ANALYSIS OF THE REPLICATOR DYNAMICS FOR AN
ASYMMETRIC HAWK-DOVE GAME
IKJYOT SINGH KOHLI AND MICHAEL C. HASLAM
Abstract. In this paper, we analyze using a dynamical systems approach, the replica-
tor dynamics for the asymmetric Hawk-Dove game in which there are a set of four pure
strategies with arbitrary payoffs. We give a full account of the equilibrium points, their
stability, and derive the Nash equilibria. We also give a detailed account of the local
bifurcations that the system exhibits based on choices of the typical Hawk-Dove param-
eters v, c. We also give details on the connections between the results found in this work
and those of the standard two-strategy Hawk-Dove game. We conclude the paper with
some examples of numerical simulations that further illustrate some global behaviour of
the system.
1. Introduction
The Hawk-Dove game is one of the first examples of a pairwise game that was used
to model the conflict between animals [Smith, 1982]. The basic idea is that “Hawks”
and “Doves” represent two types of behaviours (actions or pure strategies) that could be
exhibited by animals of the same species [Webb, 2006]. In the standard Hawk-Dove game,
individuals can use one of two possible pure strategies. In one case, they can be aggressive/a
“Hawk”, which is typically denoted byH, or be non-aggressive/a “Dove”, which is typically
denoted by D. Then, at various times, individuals in this population can have a conflict
over a resource which has value v, where the winner of the conflict gets the resource, which
the loser pays a cost c.
The hawk-dove game has been studied in the context of replicator dynamics a number of
times over the past number of years. Some examples of these studies include [Bomze, 1983,
Roca et al., 2009,Taylor et al., 2004,Ficici and Pollack, 2000,Samuelson, 2002,Friedman, 1998,
Fudenberg et al., 2006,Johnstone, 2001,Dall et al., 2004,Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998,Wydick, 2007,
Ahmed and Hegazi, 2006,Doebeli and Hauert, 2005,Traulsen et al., 2007,Weibull, 1997].
In replicator dynamics, it is assumed that individuals are programmed to use only pure
strategies from a finite set S = {s1, . . . , sk}. It can be shown [Webb, 2006] that the
dynamical evolution of the proportion of individuals using strategy si, xi, is given by:
(1) x˙i = [pi(si,x)− p¯i(x)] xi,
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where pi(si,x) is the payoff to individuals using strategy si, while p¯i(x) is known as the
average payoff and is defined as
(2) p¯i(x) =
k∑
i=1
xipi(si,x).
Further to Eq. (1), one also has the constraint:
(3)
k∑
i=1
xi = 1.
In this paper, we wish to consider an asymmetric pairwise Dove-Hawk game. Follow-
ing [Webb, 2006], specifically, this is where two individuals are contesting ownership of a
territory that one of them controls. One assumes that the value of the territory and costs
of contest are the same for both players. Unlike the standard Hawk-Dove game described
above , players can now condition their behaviour on the role that they occupy, which is
typically denoted as owner or intruder. So, the pure strategies now take the form play
Hawk if owner, and play Dove if intruder, which we will denote by HD. Therefore, there
are a set of four pure strategies:
(4) S = {HH,HD,DH,DD} .
From these arguments, it can be shown [Webb, 2006], that the payoff matrix is given by
Table 1.
HH HD DH DD
HH (v − c)/2, (v − c)/2 (3v − c)/4, (v − c)/4 (3v − c)/4, (v − c)/4 v, 0
HD (v − c)/4, (3v − c)/4 v/2, v/2 (2v − c)/4, (2v − c)/4 3v/4, v/4
DH (v − c)/4, (3v − c)/4 (2v − c)/4, (2v − c)/4 v/2, v/2 3v/4, v/4
DD 0, v v/4, 3v/4 v/4, 3v/4 v/2, v/2
Table 1. The payoff matrix for the asymmetric Hawk-Dove game.
We note that the replicator dynamics of this four-strategy asymmetric hawk-dove game
has not been analyzed from a dynamical systems perspective in the literature to the best of
the authors’ knowledge. However, some examples of related asymmetric games can be found
in [Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992,Matsumura and Kobayashi, 1998,Nakamaru and Sasaki, 2003,
He et al., 2014,McAvoy and Hauert, 2015,Uehara and Iwasa, 2010,Sekiguchi and Ohtsuki, 2015,
Benz et al., 2005,Cressman, 2003].
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2. The Dynamical Equations
Let us denote by (x, y, z, w) the proportion of individuals who use strategies HH,HD,DH
and DD respectively. Then,from the payoff matrix in Table 1 and Eqs. (1)-(2), the repli-
cator dynamics are given by the following dynamical system:
x˙ =
1
4
x [−c(2x+ y + z)− 4p¯i(x) + v(4w + 2x+ 3(y + z))] ,(5)
y˙ =
1
4
y [−c(x+ z)− 4p¯i(x) + v(3w + x+ 2(y + z))] ,(6)
z˙ =
1
4
z [−c(x+ y)− 4p¯i(x) + v(3w + x+ 2(y + z))] ,(7)
w˙ =
1
4
w [v(2w + y + z)− 4p¯i(x)] ,(8)
(9)
where
(10) p¯i(x) =
1
2
[v − c(x+ y)(x+ z)] ,
and from Eq. (3),
(11) x+ y + z + w = 1.
This four-dimensional dynamical system can be reduced to three dimensions if we set
via Eq. (11), w = 1 − x − y − z. Therefore, in what follows, we will study the following
unconstrained three-dimensional system:
x˙ =
1
4
x
[
c
(
2x2 + 2x(y + z − 1) + 2yz − y − z
)
− v(2x+ y + z − 2)
]
,(12)
y˙ = −
1
4
y [v(2x+ y + z − 1)− c(2x+ 2y − 1)(x+ z)] ,(13)
z˙ = −
1
4
z [v(2x+ y + z − 1)− c(x+ y)(2x + 2z − 1)] .(14)
3. A Local Stability Analysis
From Eqs. (12)-(14), we now present the equilibrium points along with their eigenvalues
and local stability. The Jacobian matrix, denoted Jij corresponding to this dynamical
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system is a 3× 3 matrix, whose entries we list as follows:
J11 =
1
4
(
c
(
6x2 + 4x(y + z − 1) + 2yz − y − z
)
− v(4x+ y + z − 2)
)
,(15)
J12 =
1
4
x(c(2x+ 2z − 1)− v),(16)
J13 =
1
4
x(c(2x+ 2y − 1)− v),(17)
J21 =
1
4
y(c(4x+ 2y + 2z − 1)− 2v),(18)
J22 =
1
4
(c(2x+ 4y − 1)(x+ z)− v(2x + 2y + z − 1)),(19)
J23 =
1
4
y(c(2x+ 2y − 1)− v),(20)
J31 =
1
4
z(c(4x+ 2y + 2z − 1)− 2v),(21)
J32 =
1
4
z(c(2x+ 2z − 1)− v),(22)
J33 =
1
4
(c(x+ y)(2x+ 4z − 1)− v(2x + y + 2z − 1)).(23)
3.1. Equilibrium Point 1. The first equilibrium point was found to be
(24) P1 : (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1)
The corresponding eigenvalues of Jij were found to be:
(25) {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{
−
v
4
,−
c
4
,
v − c
4
}
.
This point is a stable node if:
(26) {v > 0} ∩ {c > v}.
It is an unstable node if:
(27) {v < 0} ∩ {c < v}.
It is a saddle if
(28)
{{v < 0} ∩ {v < c < 0}}
⋃
{{v < 0} ∩ {c > 0}}
⋃
{{v > 0} ∩ {c < 0}}
⋃
{{v > 0} ∩ {0 < c < v}} .
3.2. Equilibrium Point 2. The second equilibrium point was found to be:
(29) P2 : (x, y, z) =
(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
)
.
The corresponding eigenvalues of Jij were found to be:
(30) {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{
c
8
,
1
8
(c− 2v),
1
8
(2v − c)
}
.
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This point is neither a stable or unstable node. However, it is a saddle under the following
conditions:
(31)
{(v ≤ 0 ∩ c < 2v) ∪ (v > 0 ∩ c < 0)}
⋃
{v > 0 ∩ 0 < c < 2v}
⋃
{v < 0 ∩ 2v < c < 0} .
3.3. Equilibrium Point 3. The third equilibrium point was found to be:
(32) P3 : (x, y, z) =
(
0,
v
c
,
v
c
)
.
The corresponding eigenvalues of Jij were found to be:
(33) {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{
v
4
,−
v(c− 2v)
4c
, 0
}
.
The single zero eigenvalue indicates that this equilibrium point is normally hyperbolic, and
the local stability can be determined through the non-zero eigenvalues by the invariant
manifold theorem [Wainwright and Ellis, 1997]. In particular, this point is a stable node
if:
(34) v < 0 ∩ 2v < c < 0.
It is an unstable node if:
(35) v > 0 ∩ 0 < c < 2v.
It is a saddle point under the following conditions:
(36) {v < 0 ∩ (c < 2v ∪ c > 0)}
⋃
{v > 0 ∩ (c < 0 ∪ c > 2v)} .
3.4. Equilibrium Point 4. The fourth equilibrium point was found to be:
(37) P4 : (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0) .
The corresponding eigenvalues of Jij were found to be:
(38) {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{
−
v
4
,−
c
4
,
v − c
4
}
.
This point is a stable node if
(39) {v > 0} ∩ {c > v}.
It is an unstable node if
(40) {v < 0} ∩ {c < v}.
It is a saddle point under the following conditions:
(41) {v < 0 ∩ v < c < 0}
⋃
{v < 0 ∩ c > 0}
⋃
{v > 0 ∩ c < 0}
⋃
{v > 0 ∩ 0 < c < v} .
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3.5. Equilibrium Point 5. The fifth equilibrium point was found to be:
(42) P5 : (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0) .
The corresponding eigenvalues of Jij were found to be:
(43) {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{
c− v
2
,
c− v
4
,
c− v
4
}
.
This point is a stable node if
(44) {v ∈ R} ∩ {c < v}.
It is an unstable node if
(45) {v ∈ R} ∩ {c > v}.
From Eq. (43), it can be seen that P5 is in fact never a saddle point of the dynamical
system.
3.6. Equilibrium Point 6. The sixth equilibrium point was found to be:
(46) P6 : (x, y, z) =
(v
c
, 0, 0
)
.
The corresponding eigenvalues of Jij were found to be:
(47) {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{
0, 0,
v(v − c)
2c
}
.
One sees that since λ1 = λ2 = 0, this point is manifestly non-hyperbolic. As such, its
stability properties cannot be determined through the Jacobian matrix.
3.7. Equilibrium Point 7. The final equilibrium point was found to be:
(48) P7 : (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0) .
The corresponding eigenvalues of Jij were found to be:
(49) {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{v
2
,
v
4
,
v
4
}
.
This point is a stable node if
(50) v < 0.
It is an unstable node if
(51) v > 0.
Further, this point is never a saddle point as can be seen from Eq. (49).
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4. Local Bifurcations
With knowledge of the equilibrium points and their local stability as given in the previous
sections, we now attempt to describe bifurcation behaviour exhibited by this dynamical
system. Analyzing bifurcation behaviour is important as this determines the local changes
in stability of the equilibrium points of the system.
The mechanism for these bifurcations can be seen as follows.
The linearized system in a neighbourhood of P1 takes the form:
x˙ =
1
4
x (v − c) ,(52)
y˙ = −
1
4
yc,(53)
z˙ =
1
4
x (c− 2v) +
c− v
4
y −
v
4
z.(54)
We see that x destabilizes P1 when v = c, y destabilizes P1 when c = 0, and that z
destabilizes P1 when v = c = 0.
The linearized system in a neighbourhood of P2 takes the form:
x˙ =
1
8
x(2v − c),(55)
y˙ =
1
8
x(c− 2v) +
1
8
y(c− v)−
1
8
vz,(56)
z˙ =
1
8
x(c− 2v) −
1
8
yv +
1
8
(c− v)z.(57)
We see that x destabilizes P2 along the line c = 2v, while y and z destabilize P2 when
v = c = 0.
The linearized system in a neighbourhood of P3 takes the form:
x˙ = 0,(58)
y˙ = −
v(c− 2v)
4c
x+
v2
4c
y +
v(v − c)
4c
z,(59)
z˙ = −
v(c− 2v)
4c
x+
v(v − c)
4c
y +
v2
4c
z.(60)
Therefore, P3 is destabilized by y and z ∀ c 6= 0, v = 0.
The linearized system in a neighbourhood of P4 takes the form:
x˙ =
1
4
x(v − c),(61)
y˙ =
1
4
(c− 2v)x−
v
4
y +
c− v
4
z,(62)
z˙ = −
c
4
z.(63)
Therefore x destabilizes P4 along the line v = c. Further, y destabilizes P4 when v = c = 0.
Finally, z destabilizes P4 when c = 0 for v ∈ R.
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The linearized system in a neighbourhood of P5 takes the form:
x˙ =
c− v
2
x+
c− v
4
y +
c− v
4
z,(64)
y˙ =
c− v
4
y,(65)
z˙ =
c− v
4
z.(66)
Therefore P5 is destabilized by x, y, and z along the line c = v.
The linearized system in a neighbourhood of P6 takes the form:
x˙ =
v(v − c)
2c
x+
v(v − c)
4c
y +
v(v − c)
4c
,(67)
y˙ = 0,(68)
z˙ = 0.(69)
Therefore, x destabilizes P6 whenever v = 0, or whenever v = c (for c 6= 0).
The linearized system in a neighbourhood of P7 takes the form:
x˙ =
v
2
x,(70)
y˙ =
v
4
y,(71)
z˙ =
v
4
z.(72)
We see that therefore, P7 is destabilized by x, y, and z whenever v = 0, for c ∈ R. From
these calculations, we can therefore see that along v = c, for as one goes from c < 0 to
c > 0, P1 and P4 go from being unstable nodes to a stable ones, and vice-versa, while P3
goes from being a stable node to an unstable one. Whenever c = 0, v ∈ R, and as one goes
from v < 0 to v > 0, P5 goes from being an unstable node to a stable node, while P7 goes
from being a stable node to an unstable one. Along the line c = 2v, as we go from v < 0 to
v > 0, P1 and P4 go from being unstable nodes to stable nodes, while P5 and P7 go from
being stable nodes to unstable nodes. Finally, whenever v = 0, c ∈ R, as we go from c < 0
to c > 0, P5 goes from being a stable node to an unstable one, while P1 and P4 go from
being unstable nodes to stable ones.
5. Nash Equilibria
Determining the future asymptotic behaviour of the replicator dynamics is of impor-
tance since by Theorem 9.15 in [Webb, 2006], if x∗ is an asymptotically stable fixed point
of the dynamical system, then the symmetric strategy pair [σ∗, σ∗] = [x∗,x∗] is a Nash
equilibrium.
Following [Anosov et al., 1997], we note that first, by Lyapunov’s theorem, if all eigen-
values of the linear part of a vector field v at a singular point have negative real part, the
singular point is asymptotically stable.
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From our stability analysis of the various equilibrium points in the preceding sections,
we therefore observe the following Nash equilibria of the replicator dynamics depending on
the choices of v and c:
(1) v > 0, c > v ⇒ P1 is asymptotically stable ⇒ [(0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1)] is a Nash equilib-
rium.
(2) v > 0, c > v ⇒ P4 is asymptotically stable ⇒ [(0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0)] is a Nash equilib-
rium.
(3) v ∈ R, c < v ⇒ P5 is asymptotically stable ⇒ [(1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0)] is a Nash equilib-
rium.
(4) c ∈ R, v < 0 ⇒ P7 is asymptotically stable ⇒ [(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0)] is a Nash equilib-
rium.
The existence of these Nash equilibria show that this asymmetric Hawk-Dove game
produces rational behaviour in a population composed of players that are not required to
make consciously rational decisions. In other words, the population is stable when, given
what everyone else is doing, no individual would get a better result by adopting a different
strategy. This is the so-called population view of a Nash equilibrium, which Nash himself
described as the mass action interpretation [Webb, 2006,Nash, 1950].
6. Connections with The Two-Strategy Hawk-Dove Game
It is perhaps of interest to discuss our results found above in connection with the standard
two-strategy hawk-dove game. Following [Webb, 2006], we note that the payoff matrix for
such a game is given by
H D
H (v − c)/2, (v − c)/2 v, 0
D 0, v v/2, v/2
Table 2. Payoff matrix for the standard two-strategy Hawk-Dove game.
In this case, the replicator dynamics are a simple consequence of Eqs. (1)-(2). Namely,
let z denote the proportion of individuals in the population that use strategy H in Table
2. Then, the replicator dynamics is governed by the single ordinary differential equation:
(73) z˙ =
c
2
z (1− z)
(v
c
− z
)
.
Clearly, Eq. (73) has equilibrium points z = 0, z = 1, and z = v/c. Let us denote by f(z)
the right-hand-side of Eq. (73). Then,
(74) f ′(z) =
1
2
[v − 2vz + cz (−2 + 3z)] .
Clearly, when z = 0, f ′(z) = v/2, which is negative when v < 0 and positive when v > 0.
Therefore, the point z = 0 is a stable node when v < 0, and an unstable node when v > 0.
Further, when z = 1, f ′(z) = (c − v)/2. In this case, the point z = 0 is a stable node for
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c ∈ R, and v > c. Further, it is an unstable node for c ∈ R and v < c. Finally, when
z = v/c, we have that f ′(z) = v(v − c)/2c. This point is a stable node when v < 0 and
v < c < 0, or, when v > 0 and c < 0 or c > v. It is unstable node when v < 0 and c < v
or c > 0, or when v > 0 and 0 < c < v.
Comparing these cases to the Nash equilibria we found in the full asymmetric game. We
see that the case when z = 0 corresponds to the case of Equilibrium Point 7 above, where
[(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0)] was a Nash equilbrium. The case z = v/c in this example corresponds
to Equilibrium Points 1 and 4 above, where [(0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1)] and [(0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0)] were
both found to be Nash equilibria of the full asymmetric replicator dynamics. Certainly,
this shows that z → v/c for any initial population that is not at an equilibrium point.
7. Some Numerical Simulations
In this section, we present some numerical simulations of the work above. These sim-
ulations were completed in MATLAB using the ODE23s solver with a variety of initial
conditions which are denoted with asterisks in the plots that follow.
In Fig. 1, we assume that v = 0.1, c = 0.2, in Fig. 2, we assume that v = 0.2, c = 0.3, in
Fig. 3, we assume that v = 0.2, c = 0.1, in Fig. 4, we assume that v = −0.1, c = 0.2, and
in Fig. 5, v = −0.2, c = −0.1.
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Figure 1. Results where v = 0.1, c = 0.2. The red cross denotes the
equilibrium point P1 : (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), and the red circle denotes the
equilibrium point P4 : (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0).
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Figure 2. Results where v = 0.2, c = 0.3. The red cross denotes the
equilibrium point P1 : (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), and the red circle denotes the
equilibrium point P4 : (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0).
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Figure 3. Results where v = 0.2, c = 0.1. The red circle denotes the
equilibrium point P5 : (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0).
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Figure 4. Results where v = −0.1, c = 0.2. The red circle denotes the
equilibrium point P7 : (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0).
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Figure 5. Results where v = −0.2, c = −0.1. The shaded red circle denotes
the equilibrium point P1 : (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1). One can see that indeed under
these choices for v and c, P1 is indeed a saddle as predicted by our stability
analysis.
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8. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed using a dynamical systems approach, the replicator dynamics
for the asymmetric Hawk-Dove game in which there are a set of four pure strategies with
arbitrary payoffs. We gave a full account of the equilibrium points, their stability, and
derived the Nash equilibria. In particular, we found that if v > 0, c > 0, then the strategy
pairs [HD,HD] and [DH,DH] are Nash equilibria. If v ∈ R, c < v, then the strategy
pair [HH,HH] is a Nash equilibrium. Finally, if c ∈ R, v < 0, then the strategy pair
[DD,DD] is a Nash equilibria. We also gave a detailed account of the local bifurcations
that the system exhibits based on choices of the typical Hawk-Dove parameters v, c. We
also gave details on the connections between the results we found and those of the standard
two-strategy Hawk-Dove game. We concluded the paper with some examples of numerical
simulations that further illustrate some global behaviour of the system.
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